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This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a federation where regional
governments provide a pure public good non-cooperatively and policy makers are neither
entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving. A high degree of household mobility across
regions forces the governments to raise the efficiency of the public good, however, it also
helps to waste resources. It is shown that regional Leviathans not only under-provide the
public good but also decrease the amount of wasteful expenditures as households become
less mobile. Central government’s intervention can enhance efficiency if households are
attached to particular regions.
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I. Introduction
There are numerous examples of transboundary spillover problems.
Regional pollutants deteriorate, for example, the stratospheric ozone shield,
the atmosphere, rivers, lakes, and forests in the federation. The spillover should
be subjected to a Pigouvian subsidy determined by a higher-level government,
namely, the central government (see, for example, Oates, 1972). In fact,
transboundary pollution control has been implemented within federal
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environmental systems or by cooperative treaties where the pollution problems
involve politically independent nations. In the United States (US), the central
government (Environmental Protection Agency) generally works with the
states in the control of environmental policy. Similarly, the center of the
European Union (EU), outlined by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (Treaty on
the European Union), implements environmental policy among the member
nations.
In a recent study, however, Wellisch (1994) demonstrates that competing
regional governments fully internalize such externalities associated with the
provision of public goods if households are perfectly mobile. That is, each
regional government will have an incentive to internalize all externalities,
including interregional spillovers, if it chooses policy variables in order to
maximize the utility of its representative resident in anticipation that utilities
will be equalized in the migration equilibrium. Such a ‘perfect incentive
equivalence’ reasoning, shown by Boadway (1982) and developed by Myers
(1990), implies that there is no efficiency role for the central government in
an economy where all households are freely mobile across regions. Wellisch
also exhibits, however, that in the case of imperfect mobility, decentralized
control is inefficient since the migration equilibrium can no longer be
characterized by equal utilities in each region. In his analysis, each household
is imperfectly mobile because she or he derives a psychic regional attachment
benefit. These benefits are likely to be very important in a federation such as
the EU and Canada where residents are culturally heterogeneous. More
recently, Caplan et al. (2000) examine the efficient scheme for imperfect mobile
households with a game where regional governments are policy leaders and
the central government is a policy follower. These efficiency results depend
on the behavior of perfectly benevolent governments.
There are two extremes on how to describe government. One, founded on
the theory of welfare economics, takes governments as benevolent maximisers
of its residents’ welfare, which is based on the fact that politicians want to be
re-elected and hence must bear in mind the utility of residents. The other
view, based on public choice, takes governments instead as Leviathans, which
pursue their own interests. Some empirical evidences, for example,
demonstrate that regional governments, including politicians and bureaucrats,
lead more resources to public expenditures than representative residents prefer,371 LEVIATHAN AND PURE PUBLIC GOODS
as in Filimon et al. (1982) and Wyckoff (1988). We can find this dichotomy
throughout all areas of public economics. However, these two theories need
not be mutually exclusive. Edwards and Keen (1996) present an approach
which reconciles these views by assuming that regional governments are
moderate Leviathans who are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self-
interested. They use the model to investigate whether capital income tax
competition among regions is beneficial. Recently, Rauscher (1998) extends
the model to include benefit taxation. These models ignore any household
mobility across regions though.
It is our purpose to integrate both models, i.e., to investigate the regional
Leviathan’s provision of a pure public good, called a federal public good;
that is, a good whose economic benefit is available for an entire federation, in
an environment of imperfectly mobile households.1 One important example
of such a public good is environmental quality. We can observe this situation
in the EU. Although one nation’s efforts to abate emissions of pollutants in
the atmosphere (e.g., carbon dioxide) contribute to the clean air within the
EU, the abatement costs as well as the Leviathan’s wasteful expenditures
compel residents in the nation to cut down their private consumptions
simultaneously. This nation’s action motivates the population to emigrate to
other nations since the Treaty of Rome (Article 48) guarantees that all EU
citizens are entitled to work in any other member nations and are treated
identically as native residents with respect to taxation, transfers and all other
social benefits. However, the degree of household mobility is much lower
than within the US since the EU consists of culturally diverse regions.
The federal regime in this paper is hierarchical like the EU economy.
However, if decentralization of government functions can yield an efficient
allocation, there is no need to introduce a central government in the spirit of
the Maastricht Treaty. This implies that only functions which cannot
satisfactorily be fulfilled by the member nations should be assigned a center
and those should be subsidiary. Therefore, we will first analyze the Nash
equilibrium for the decentralized provision of the federal public good.
1 In the case of perfectly mobile households, Wrede (1998) synthesizes both models without
interregional spillovers.372 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
The difference in household mobility will prove to be quite important
since the conclusions differ in both cases. The regional Leviathans provide
the federal public good efficiently and the socially efficient population
distribution holds in an environment of perfect household mobility.
Furthermore, perfect mobility requires them to waste resources until the
marginal costs of their expenditures are equalized. If households move across
regions imperfectly, however, the Leviathans have no incentive to provide
the federal public good efficiently. But they decrease the amount of wasteful
expenditures as households become less mobile. Later, we analyze whether a
central government’s intervention can enhance efficiency by utilizing a regime
similar to the Structural and Cohesion Funds in the EU, where regional
governments have precommitted to their policies and the center has been
endowed with an instrument to redistribute income among regions after it
observes regional contributions to the federal public good.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic model of
a federal public good in a federal economy and derives the social optimum.
Section III demonstrates the decentralized decision-making of regional
Leviathan governments. It examines whether household mobility can tame
Leviathan governments and hence improve social welfare. Section IV
investigates the implications of a central government’s intervention in a setting
similar to the EU. Section V summarizes and concludes.
II. The Basic Structure of the Model
The federation consists of two regions denoted by i = 1, 2. The size of the
national population is normalized to unity. The population of region i is indexed
by ni. Obviously, ni + n2 = 1, as all households must reside at some location in
the federation. Households in region i are assumed to derive utility from
consumption of xi units of numeraire goods and G units of the federal public
good, with the utility function: U(xi , G), where  0,
i
x U >   0,
i





GG U <  and  0.
i
xG U ³ Furthermore, we introduce imperfect mobility for
households by supposing heterogeneous preferences with respect to home
attachment as in Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and in Wellisch (1994). Each
type of household, denoted by n, is assumed to be distributed uniformly on
the interval [0, 1]. Then, the utility function of type n household is:373 LEVIATHAN AND PURE PUBLIC GOODS
() () 1 ,1 UxG a n +-
if the household lives in region 1, and
() 2 ,, UxG a n +
if she or he lives in region 2. The parameter n measures the non-pecuniary
benefit the household derives from living in region 2, the parameter (1 – n)
the benefit from living in region 1 and the constant parameter a ³ 0 denotes
the attachment intensity. For a = 0, households are perfectly mobile across
regions. As a increases, households become less mobile, since the psychic
benefit each household derives from a region is idiosyncratic, a migration
equilibrium can be characterized by the marginal household, indexed by n1,
who is just indifferent between locating in either region.
() ()() 11 2 1 ,1 , UxG a n UxG a n +-= +                                                            (1)
Households with n < n1 reside in region 1 and those with n > n1 live in region
2. It is obvious that the marginal household n1 also indicates the population of
households residing in region 1.
Each household supplies inelastically one unit of homogeneous labor in
the region of residence. Perfectly competitive firms produce numeraire goods
with a constant-returns-to-scale production function Fi (ni, Ti) º ¦ i (ni). Ti is
the fixed resource endowment of region i, say land. Numeraire goods can be
used in the production of the federal public good G with MRTGx = 1. The
feasibility constraint for the federation is
() ()
12
12 1 1 2 2 0. fn fn n xn x G +- - - =                                                        (2)
For a fixed q Î [0, 1], an efficient allocation can be obtained as a solution
to the following problem:
{} () () () 12
,, 1 , 2
Maximize , 1 , ,
ii xG n i UxG UxG qq
=
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subject to (1), (2), n1 + n2 = 1, xi ³ 0, G ³ 0 and ni ³ 0.2 Assuming the solution
is interior, the efficient allocation is determined by (1), (2) and (3) through
(5) below:
                                                                                                                    (3)
                                                                                                                    (4)
n1 + n2 = 1          (5)
Eq. (3) is the familiar Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of the
federal public good; the regional sum of the marginal benefits on the LHS
must be equal to the marginal costs on the RHS. Eqs. (4) and (5) give the
optimal population distribution between the two regions. If households are
perfectly mobile: a = 0, then the net social benefits of an additional mobile
household to a region must be equalized across regions in the unique efficient
equilibrium: 
12
12 . nn fxfx -= -  If households are imperfectly mobile: a > 0,
there must be a range of efficient population distributions, which depend on
the center’s weight parameter q Î[0, 1].
III. The Regional Government
In a decentralized setting, each regional government is assumed to behave
as a moderate Leviathan which derives utility from public expenditures Ci as
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2 Although this maximization problem ignores locational tastes, it can characterize an
efficient allocation for a given weight q as in Mansoorian and Myers (1997). To see this,
assume w n to be the welfare weight on household n where 
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and Keen (1996), the Leviathan’s utility function is assumed to be a quasi-
concave function for i = 1, 2: V(Ci, U(xi, G)), where the ordinary demands for
Ci and Ui are both normal. Competitive firms pay a labor a wage equal to
marginal product. We assume that land in a region is owned solely by the
residents of the region on an equal per capita basis. Since firms are assumed
to earn no profits, the total land rent accrues to the residents. Firms’ production
in region i can be used not only in the regional provision of federal public
good Gi but also as wasteful expenditures Ci, which benefit only politicians,
on a one-to-one basis. The regional government collects a residence-based
head tax to finance these public expenditures and a non-negative interregional
transfer from i to j: Zij ³ 0. We assume that the regional government i takes
{Zji, Gj, Cj} as given in choosing {Zij, Gi, Ci}. Using these assumptions, the
feasibility constraint for region i becomes
() () 0
i
ii i i i i jj i fn n xGC Z Z -- - --= for i, j = 1, 2, i ¹ j.                                     (6)
Inserting (6) for xi into (1) gives the migration equilibrium condition, which
determines ni  as an implicit function of the regional control variables:
() ,, ,, , . ii j j i i j i j nn Z Z G G C C =                                                                      (7)
A straightforward exercise in comparative statics yields the following
migration responses for i, j = 1, 2, i ¹ j.
                                                                               and                                (8)
where  () () 20 .
ii jj
xn i i xn j j DU f x nU f x n a º- +-- < 3  The regional
government  i’s problem is to
,
ij
























3  Stability of the migration equilibrium requires D to be negative. (See Boadway, 1982,
and Stiglitz, 1977). We implicitly assume stable equilibria with populated regions, i.e.,
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subject to (6), (7), Zij ³ 0, Gi ³ 0, Ci ³ 0 and Gi + Gj = G.
The first-order conditions for i, j = 1, 2, i ¹ j are
                                                                          and                                      (9)
                                                                                          and                         (10)
                                                                                and                             (11)
Inserting the migration response (8) into (9) and rearranging yields
                                                     for i, j = 1, 2, i ¹ j.                                (12)
These first-order conditions for both regions together indicate that
decentralized decisions of regional governments always achieve the socially
efficient population distribution condition (4) regardless of whether
governments are malevolent or benevolent. Assuming an interior solution for
Gi, combining (8) and (10) gives
                                                                       for i, j = 1, 2, i ¹ j.                     (13)
Comparing (3) with (13), it is clear that the Samuelson condition can only be
achieved if the region makes a strictly positive interregional transfer. Hereafter
we say the region is “not transfer-constrained” since in this case (12) holds as
an equality, as in Wellisch (1994). Furthermore, substituting (8) into (11), the
first-order conditions for choosing Ci  become
                                                              for i, j = 1, 2, i ¹ j.                        (14)
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government expenditures and outlays on the federal public good. We focus
our attention on situations where both regional governments are malevolent:
Ci > 0 for i = 1, 2, since Wellisch (1994) analyzes the case of purely benevolent
governments: Ci = 0 for i = 1, 2. Needless to say, each government chooses
wasteful expenditures in line with equality (14), which states that the MRS in
government i’s preference for increasing in a representative resident’s utility,
in terms of wasteful expenditures,  ,
ii
UC VV must equal the marginal costs.
The marginal costs are caused by incrementing the utility of households
measured in units of the numeraire good.
In the perfect mobility case: a = 0, inequalities (12) indicate that both
regions are not transfer-constrained. This implies that both governments must
have the correct incentive to attain not only the efficient population
distribution condition (4), but also the Samuelson condition (3). Furthermore,
equalities (14) indicate that, for given amounts of wasteful expenditures, the
MRSs must coincide across the Leviathan governments:
.
ij i i j j
ix jx U C U C nU nU V V V V +== This implies that Ci = Cj, since the
migration equilibrium Ui = Uj means  .
ij
CC VV = Thus, the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 1: If households are perfectly mobile and regions provide a
federal public good, then the Leviathan governments lead to an efficient
allocation for the populations and the federal public good but wasteful
expenditures. They choose the same amount of wasteful expenditures in the
equilibrium.
Perfect mobility implies the equal utility migration equilibrium. That is,
non-myopic governments must decide on their policies taking account of the
utilities of non-residents as well as those of residents. Hence, both governments
have to provide the public good according to the Samuelson condition and to
agree upon a population distribution that attain a common utility level for all
households in the federation. At the same time, these governments agree upon
wasteful expenditures as well as net interregional transfers. In other words,
each Leviathan increases wasteful expenditures until the marginal benefits
are equalized. Obviously, comparing (2) with the sum of (6) for both regions378 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
4 Wellisch proved that at least one region must be transfer-constrained in the case of imperfect
household mobility. See Proposition 2 and 3 in Wellisch (1994). If the production functions
are the same in both regions, then interregional differences can only be attributed to different
land endowments. The greater the interregional differences, the more likely it is that the
region with the higher land endowment will make a strictly positive transfer.
5 Wellisch (1994) demonstrates that a transfer-constrained region always undersupplies
the public goods generating trans-boundary externality relative to the Samuelson criterion.
demonstrates that this equilibrium, called the second best, is not the socially
optimum because of the amount of wasteful expenditures.
When households are imperfectly mobile: a > 0, the equilibrium allocation
is inefficient even if Ci = 0 for both regions, since at least one region must fail
to provide the federal public good in accordance with the Samuelson
condition.4 Now we are interested in whether high degrees of household
mobility reduce Leviathans’ wasteful expenditures. In order to obtain the
impact of an increase in the attachment parameter a on Ci, we have to apply
the implicit function theorem on the entire set of first-order conditions of
both regions; i.e., eqs. (12), (13) and (14). Instead, it is useful to focus on
symmetric cases so as to make the result clear. If there is no difference across
regions, then both regions are transfer-constrained since the first-order
conditions (12) hold as inequalities:  0, Z = %  where tildes above variables denote
values in the environment of identical regions. In a symmetric equilibrium,
each region has no incentive to provide the federal public good according to
the Samuelson condition.5 However, each region reduces wasteful
expenditures compared to the case where there is no attachment to regions.
This can be derived by the following system, which simply restates the first-
order conditions (13) and (14):
                                                                                                              (15)
                                                                                                                              (16)
The appendix in Section A.I provides an explicit solution to this problem.
Here, we summarize the results in
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Proposition 2: If households are imperfectly mobile and identical regions
provide a federal public good, then the transfer constrained Leviathan has
no incentive to provide the federal public good efficiently but it reduces
wasteful expenditures as the intensity of attachment benefit to regions becomes
larger.
Proposition 2 implies that the sum of Leviathans’ wasteful expenditures
become the maximum in the case of perfect mobility. In this case, the marginal
cost of the wasteful expenditures in the whole federation is
() 2.
ij i i j j
ix jx U C U C nU nU V V V V += + If households are immobile, the
marginal cost is  .
ij i i j j
ix jx U C U C nU nU V V V V +=+  This is the minimum level
of wasteful expenditures. Namely, if households are more mobile across
regions, then the opportunity costs of wasteful expenditures shrink and hence
the Leviathan governments increase their own expenditures strategically in
order to lead part of the populations to emigrate to the other region, since the
assumption  0
i
ni fx -< implies that each region is better off the less inhabitants
it has. Note that  0
i
ni fx -=  can happen in a stable equilibrium when a > 0. In
this limit case, the degree of household mobility a is independent of G % and
. C % 6 The allocation is just same as the preceding result at a ® ¥ except that
the governments have no incentive to get rid of excess population and hence
respond to a change on a.
Since imperfectly mobile households prevent the Leviathan governments
from providing the federal public good according to the Samuelson condition,
although they cut down their wasteful expenditures in comparison with the
case of perfect mobility, for taxpayers the equilibrium is worse than the second
best allocation. There are some possibilities for a central government to
overcome the problem. The following section examines the intervention of
the central government and its implications for the allocation of resources in
the federation.
IV. The Central Government
Let us now consider a situation whereby there are one central government
6 I thank the co-editor for suggesting this explanation for the limit case.380 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
and two regional governments in the federation. Since we are basically
interested in whether households benefit from the central government’s
intervention, it is useful to assume that the center is benevolent in order to
compare the results with the decentralized setting in the previous section.
Furthermore, we assume that the right to choose both the provision of the
federal public good and wasteful expenditures is left in the hands of regional
governments and that the center only controls the net interregional transfer.
Although there are several ways for the central government to control the
federation, this indirect method seems to be more appropriate in the EU case,
since it’s difficult to imagine that member nations would be willing to give up
their responsibility to the supranational institution. The center cannot interfere
with the locational choices of households and has to face the migration
equilibrium (1) and the following budget constraint:
S1 + S2 = 0,                                                                                                 (17)
where Si for i, j = 1, 2 is the federal tax (subsidy if negative). Then, the budget
constraint (6) can be rewritten as
() 0
i
ii i i i i fn n xGC S -- - - = for i, j = 1, 2.                                            (18)
Combining (1), (17) for S2 and (18) determines ni as an implicit function of
the center and regional control variables:
() 1 ,,,, . ii j i j nn S G G C C ¢ =                                                                           (19)
Differentiation of (19) gives the following migration responses for i, j = 1, 2,
i ¹ j:
                                                                                                                  (20)
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7 This description for the representative utility in politician’s preference fits the electoral
system used, e.g., to elect members of the US House of Representatives, where candidates
are elected in local districts by plurality rule and each district receives a number of seats
roughly proportional to its share of the total population. Alternatively, under a system of
proportional representation, U(xi, G) would represent the expected fraction of seats for the
region.
subject to (17) through (19) and Gi + Gj = G, where d and 1-d indicate the
subjective weights of the center for respective regions.7 The behavior of the
center is characterized by the following first-order condition:
                                                                                                                  (21)
Inserting the migration response (20) into the first-order condition and
rearranging yields the efficient population distribution condition (4) with d
acting in q ’s place. We can use this equation to define the implicit function:
() 1 ,,, . ij ij Ss G G C C =                                                                                (22)
Differentiation of the implicit function yields the following partial derivatives:
                                                for i, j = 1, 2, i ¹ j.                                      (23)
where d1 = d, d2 = 1 - d and the derivative with respect to S1 is
Both regional governments determine their policies, taking the reaction
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Then, the regional government i’s problem is to
subject to (17) through (19), (22), Gi ³ 0, Ci ³ 0 and Gi + Gj = G. Assuming
interior solutions, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following first-
order conditions:
                                                                                                                    (24)
                                                                                                                   (25)
                                                                                                                   (26)
                                                                                                                  (27)
Inserting the migration responses (20) and the center’s responses (23) into
(24) and (25) yields the Samuelson condition (3). We demonstrate the detailed
derivation in Section A.II. This allows us to state
Lemma 1: If the central government controls the interregional transfer, then
both regional Leviathans supply the federal public good efficiently regardless
of imperfect household mobility across regions.
The result above makes it clear that the decentralized provision of the federal
public good with the interregional transfer mechanism implemented by the
center induces the regional Leviathans to behave efficiently. That is, each
regional Leviathan is endowed with the correct incentive to fully internalize
the spillover effect associated with the provision of the federal public good.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in Section A.III, eqs. (26) and (27) imply the
equalization of the MRS across regional Leviathans in the Nash equilibrium:
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Lemma 2: If the central government controls the interregional transfer, then
both Leviathans’ marginal benefits are equated even if households are
imperfectly mobile across regions.
The center’s interregional transfer mechanism forces regions to equate their
marginal costs of wasteful expenditures and hence to increase the total amount
of wasteful expenditures in the federation as much as those which are chosen
in the case of perfect household mobility. Nevertheless, the central intervention
is valid in the sense of the Samuelson efficiency. Needless to say, the
intervention scheme can attain the second best allocation. Then, we can
summarize these findings as follows:
Proposition 3: If regional policy makers waste resources and households
are imperfectly mobile, then the interregional transfer mechanism implemented
by the center attains the second best allocation. If households are perfectly
mobile, however, there is no efficient role for the central government.
This is good news for federations such as the EU. The results suggest that the
efficiency of a federal public good is contingent on the redistributive
mechanism of the central government (e.g., Structural and Cohesion Funds
in the EU).
V. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the decentralized provision of a public good by
governments who are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving in a
federation, such as the EU, characterized by imperfect household mobility.
We show that in the decentralized Nash equilibrium, Leviathan governments
not only under-supply the federal public good but also under-waste resources
as households become immobile across regions. We also demonstrate that
the center’s intervention with the interregional transfer enhances efficiency if
households are imperfectly mobile.
The result derived in this paper may be applied to many situations where
governments are neither purely benevolent nor purely malevolent and regional
public goods cause interregional spillovers in the federation. Consider, for384 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
instance, the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) tests in the EU. Each
regional BSE test contributes to safety of the food (cow) market, as a pure
public good, in the EU. Defense forces for the peace and health services to
reduce infectious diseases can also be the examples of the federal public
good. The central government can induce regions to contribute in line with
the Samuelson efficiency despite the intensity of household attachment to
regions. However, our result also implies that there is no efficient role for the
central government in the case of perfect household mobility as well as when
regional Leviathans provide regional public goods with no transboundary
externality; in this case, since the Samuelson efficiency always holds regardless
of household attachment benefit, the center’s intervention only maximize the
amount of wasteful expenditures in the federation.
It is important, however, to discuss a few restrictions in the analysis. First,
the introduction of imperfect household mobility is done in a rather restrictive
form. Following Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Wellisch (1994), we
assume that only the psychic attachments to regions are different among
households. Different formulations of the imperfect mobility might bring
different characteristics in the second best of this paper. Second, our efficiency
result crucially depends on the benevolentness of the central government. If
it were malevolent, the outcome would be changed.8 Furthermore, the result
implies that it’s necessary for efficiency to pay the maximum costs of regional
wasteful expenditures. Hence, it is important for the efficiency enhancing
transfer system in a federation to monitor behaviors of governments and to
check the costs-benefits analysis by taking the Leviathan costs into account.
Finally, we have abstracted from capital mobility. Introducing two sorts of
imperfect mobility might lead new insight on the analysis.
Appendix
A.I. Responses to the Degree of Household Mobility
The basic purpose of this appendix is to derive the response dC da % to prove
Proposition 2. Total differentiation of (15) and (16) yields
8 If the center’s utility function is also moderate Leviathan type: V(C, dU1 + (1 - d) U2), the
center’s intervention will never enhance efficiency.385 LEVIATHAN AND PURE PUBLIC GOODS
                                                                                                                  (28)
with
where  0. nx n ff x º- <
Let  G  denote the 2´2 matrix on the LHS of (28). It follows that FG < 0 and
YC < 0 with the normality assumption. We assume that  0 G> to ensure
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The sign of dG da % is ambiguous in general and depends on the sign of the
square bracket; e.g., if UxG = 0, then  0. dG da < %  However, it is clear that
0. dC da < % That is, each Leviathan decreases wasteful expenditures in a
symmetric equilibrium as households become less mobile.
A.II. Efficiency of the Federal Public Good
In this appendix, we show that both regional Leviathans supply the federal
public good in accordance with the Samuelson condition. From the migration
responses (20), it obtains the following result:
                                                                                                         (29)
Furthermore, the center’s responses to regions (23) imply that
                                                                                                                  (30)
Combining (29) with (30) yields
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Subtracting (25) from (24) and using (30) and (31) gives
Dividing this equation by D and using (20), it obtains
                                                                                                                  (32)
It is clear that the expression in the parenthesis of (32) equals zero because
2a/D < 0. Given the result above, the first-order conditions (24) and (25)
reduce to
Add these equations and utilize (30) to obtain the Samuelson condition (3).
A.III. Equalization of MRS across Leviathans
Here we demonstrate that in the Nash equilibrium, the regional Leviathans
choose their wasteful expenditures so that the marginal benefits are equated
across governments. The procedure is quite similar to A.II. From the migration
responses (20), and the center’s responses (23), it obtains:
                                                                                                             (33)
Hence,
                                              (34)
Subtracting (27) from (26) and using (20), (33) and (34) yields
() ()
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 (35)
Assume  that  
11 22 . UC UC VV VV =   Then  the  expression  in  the  parenthesis
of (35) equals zero because a > 0. Given these results and the assumption
above, the first-order conditions (26) and (27) reduce to:
11 22 1 2
12 . UC UC x x VV VV n U nU == +Hence, the assumption is self-confirmed
as the Nash equilibrium.
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